It is shown that the feasibly constructive arithmetic theory IPV does not prove (double negation of) LMIN(NP), unless the polynomial hierarchy CPV-provably collapses. It is proved that PV plus (double negation of) LMIN(NP) intuitionistically proves PIND(coNP). It is observed that PV+ PIND(NP∪coNP) does not intuitionistically prove NPB, a scheme which states that the extended Frege systems are not polynomially bounded.
Introducing Classical and Intuitionistic Bounded Arithmetic
The theory P V is an equational theory of polynomial time functions introduced by Stephen Cook, (P V ) i is its extension to intuitionistic first-order logic and IP V is the intuitionistic theory of P V plus polynomial induction on NP formulas. Here an NP formula is a formula equivalent to an atomic formula (in the language of P V ) prefixed by a bounded existential quantifier (see [CU] ). Also, the instance of the Polynomial Induction P IN D with respect to a distinguished free variable x on a formula ϕ(x) is the sentence [A(0) ∧ ∀x (A( x 2 ) → A(x))] → ∀xA(x)
.
The NP formulas represent precisely the NP relations in the standard model. coNP formulas are defined dually. The theory (P V ) i proves the Principle of Excluded Middle for atomic formulas (of P V ).
The classical deductive closure of P V is usually denoted P V 1 . CP V is the classical version of IP V .
In the following, the notation ≡ i between two sets of formulas is used to show that they have the same intuitionistic consequences. Also, i denotes provability in intuitionistic (first-order) logic.
If Γ is a set (collection) of formulas, ¬Γ denotes the set of formulas of the form ¬ϕ with ϕ ∈ Γ.
For the definition of Kripke models of intuitionistic bounded arithmetic and basic results about them, see [M2] and [B2] . The general results on intuitionistic logic and arithmetic, and also Kripke models, can be found in [TD] .
For a set T of sentences, a T -normal Kripke model is a Kripke model in which all the worlds (classically) satisfy T .
Polynomial induction versus length minimization
In this section we work in the language of P V . Also, (P V ) i is the underlying theory for all intuitionistic theories we will mention.
The instance of the length minimization LM IN with respect to a distinguished free variable x on a formula ϕ(x) is the sentence
We will compare intuitionistic schemes of polynomial induction and length minimization on NP formulas. By ¬¬LM IN (NP), we denote the intuitionistic theory axiomatized by P V plus the set of all doubly negated instances of LM IN on NP formulas. 
Proof First note that (P V )
i is contained in the theory ¬¬LM IN (NP) by our assumption, so each of the nodes in K forces (P V )
i . But (P V ) i is a universal theory, so each node satisfies the classical deductive closure of (P V ) i , i.e. P V 1 . Therefore, the union of the worlds in K satisfies P V 1 . Recall that CP V ≡ c P V + P IN D(coNP). So, it is enough to show that P IN D(coNP) holds in the union. Assume that the union does not satisfy P IN D(A(x)), for some coNP formula A. Here, it is possible that A has other free variables, besides the one explicitly shown. Let A be of the form ∀yB(y, x), where B is a quantifier-free formula. Assume C to be the formula ∃y¬B(y, x), an NP formula. There would exist a node M γ present in K and some a ∈ M γ , such that (a) M γ ¬C(0) ∧ C(a) and (b) the union satisfies ∀x(¬C( ) → ¬C(x)) (here we have replaced all other free variables of C with parameters from M γ ). We have γ C(a) (because forcing and truth of C(a) are equivalent) and γ ¬C(0) (since the union satisfies ∀yB(y, 0)). Therefore,
In particular, for some δ ≥ γ and some (necessarily nonzero)
Therefore, the union satisfies ¬C(
Hence, the union satisfies C(d). The combination of these two leads to a contradiction to (b).
It is known that CP V proves LM IN (NP). Here, we show that even ¬¬LM IN (NP) is not provable in IP V under some plausible complexity-theoretic assumption.
Proof Assume IP V ¬¬LM IN (NP). Any ω-chain of (classical) models of CP V can be considered as a Kripke model of IP V whose underlying accessibility relation has order type ω (the proof is straightforward, see [M2] ). Now, by the assumption, this model forces ¬¬LM IN (NP) as well, hence by 2.1, the union of its worlds should satisfy CP V . This shows that CP V is an inductive theory. Hence, using the well-known characterization of the inductive theories (see e.g. [CK, Th. 3.2.3] ), CP V should be ∀ 2 . Now, using ∀ 2 -conservativity of CP V over P V 1 (see [B1, Th. 5.3.6 and Coro. 6.4 .8]), we get CP V ≡ P V 1 which is what we wanted.
It is known that, under the assumption CP V = P V 1 , the polynomial hierarchy CP Vprovably collapses, see [K, Theorem 10.2.4 ].
Here we state a small result which is a converse to Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.3 If K (P V )
i and the union of the worlds in any path of K satisfies CP V , then K P IN D(coNP).
Proof Note that a coNP formula is forced at a node α of a Kripke model of P V if and only if it is satisfied in the union of the worlds in any path above α.
Theorem 2.4 P V + LM IN (NP) i P IN D(coNP).
Proof The proof is similar to the one for Proposition 2.1. Let K P V + LM IN (NP). Consider an arbitrary coNP formula A(x, y). Assume α is an arbitrary node in K and
We shall show that α ∀xA(x, b). If for every β α, M β A(x, b), then we have α ∀xA(x, b). Suppose not. Assume η α does not have the mentioned property. Let A(x, b) be of the form ∀zB(x, z), where B is a quantifier-free formula. Assume C(x) to be the formula ∃z¬B(x, z), an NP formula.
We have M η C(0) and M η C(a) for some a ∈ M η . Hence, by K LM IN (NP), we get η ∃x(C(x) ∧ ∀z ≤ x 2 ¬C(z)). Clearly, such a node η forces P IN D (A(x, b) ).
Corollary 2.5 ¬¬LM IN (NP) i P IN D(coNP).
Proof Using the general equivalence ¬¬(A → B) ≡ i (A → ¬¬B), it is easy to see that
for any coNP formula A. Now, Theorem 2.4 immediately implies what we want.
3 Unprovability of N P B in P V + P IN D(NP∪coNP)
Let f be a one-place function symbol of IP V . Suppose f is provably an increasing function and provably dominates any polynomial growth rate function. Let N P B(f ) be the formula
Here T AU T (y) states that y is the Godel number of a propositional tautology and z eF y states that z is the Godel number of an extended Frege proof of the formula coded by y, see [K] for the definitions. In the sequel, we fix f and write N P B instead of N P B f .
Cook and Urquhart [CU, Th. 10.16] proved that, IP V N P B using their characterization of provably total functions of IP V . Krajicek and Pudlak proved that P V 1 N P B by constructing a chain of models of P V 1 such that the union of its worlds does not satisfy N P B, see [K] . Buss [B2] used the model theoretic method of Krajicek and Pudlak and also used Kripke models to show that IP V + ¬¬N P B. The theory IP V + which was introduced by Buss [B2] apparently is stronger than IP V and is sound and complete with respect to CP V -normal Kripke structures. Here, we use a simple model theoretic proof to show P V + P IN D(N P ∪coN P ) i N P B. This theory is actually equivalent to the theory IP V * , which is by definition the intuitionistic theory axiomatized by P V + P IN D(N P ∪ ¬¬N P ), originally mentioned in [CU] and studied in [M1] . The reason is that, by [M2, Theorem 2.3] N P B is intuitionistically equivalent to ∀x∃y∀zNPB M . Here N P B M is an atomic formula formalizing "x y, and z is a satisfying assignment of y, and if z f (y) then z is not an extended Frege proof of y". Below, we work with this form of N P B. [K, Theorem 7.6.3] . Now, consider the obvious two-node Kripke model. It is easy to see that this Kripke model forces P V + P IN D(NP∪coNP). On the other hand this model does not force the prenex sentence N P B since otherwise its root-model would satisfy this sentence, which is a contradiction. Here we just mention that, by the following theorem, which is the main result of [CU] , all prenex consequences of IP V are already provable in (P V ) i : ∀xφ(x, f (x)).
Note that, in part (ii) above, the function symbol f does not belong to the language of IS 1 2 ; however by part (i), it can be expressed in the language.
